In response to growing popular dissatisfaction with politics and politicians there has been a marked increase in academic work about anti-politics and depoliticization with numerous scholars seeking to defend politics by restating why it matters. However, these efforts have largely glossed over the related question of why politicians also matter. To fill this gap I propose a typology that captures how the different intellectual perspectives in this debate see the role of politicians -identifying six in particular: procedural, legitimacy, values, authority, persuasion and dissimulation. In doing so I review each contribution and highlight synergies and disagreements between them that in-turn reveal important insights and new lines of inquiry.
Introduction
It has become accepted wisdom that popular faith in politicians has reached record lows.
Aside from the frequent anecdotal reminders that newspaper columnists and talkback radio hosts provide, popular opinion polls consistently confirm that the public have a very low opinion of our political leaders (for discussion see Flinders, 2012a, pp. vii-x; Stoker, 2006, pp. 1-7; Hay, 2007, pp. 11-39; Evans, Stoker & Nasir, 2013) . According to this analysis, the conduct of politics and politicians are 'an unpleasant feature of modern life' with a significant proportion of citizens across Anglo-European countries agreeing that they should 'stop talking and take action', while a large minority believe that they would be served better if decisions were left to 'successful business people' or 'independent experts' (Evans, Stoker & Nasir, 2013, p 11) . The picture presented by this material is of an erosion of public trust in those who govern; possibly beyond repair or resuscitation.
In response to rising disillusionment with politics and associated debates about depoliticization, there has been a concerted attempt by some academics to defend politics and restate why it matters. There are a number of possible reasons why this task has largely fallen to the academy -a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article -including the fact that political actors who engage in apologetics gain little traction with voters and constituents. Certainly, praising politics and politicians rarely sells newsprint. However, despite some willingness to defend politics, with few exceptions the recent literature has not developed a forthright case for why we also need politicians. This is, I believe, a worrying oversight. As Peter Riddell (2010) asks, how can we defend politics without also defending politicians? Or, as David Easton (1965, p 212 & 216) argued more dramatically, the history of regimes tells us that political systems in which the governed do not support or have confidence in those who occupy authority roles tend not to survive.
The stakes then, are high. In this article I take up this challenge to provide a case for why we need politicians by reviewing the recent literature on anti-politics. This is not a new question. Max Weber's ( [1922 ) tripartite leadership model -traditional, legal rational and charismatic -is one of the most famous attempts to provide a theoretical justification for why modern government needs politicians but, in one way or another, since antiquity students of politics have reflected on why society needs leaders. In this article I am interested in contemporary rather than classical thinking. Specifically, I compare competing conceptualisations of why we need politicians that emerge from the literature concerned with anti-politics. I review how this body of work conceives of the different roles politicians should play and the normative standards used to assess whether they fulfil them. In doing so I create a typology (Table 1) of reasons for why we need politicians. What we learn from this exercise is that there is a great deal of diversity, even within this relatively small body of work, about why their function is important to democratic government. In turn, this recognition opens up new avenues of inquiry; both conceptual -there is an urgent need to link this recent literature to broader theoretical debates about why we need leaders and who they should be -and empirical -I conclude by outlining ways that further research might clarify some of the differences and coalesce around shared understandings that emerge from this work.
Let me make two important caveats before I begin. Firstly, this is an unwieldy literature and, as with all such reviews, deciding what to leave in and out is difficult. For the most part I have chosen to restrict discussion to what we might loosely call recent critical perspectives at the expense of the more mainstream literature (for example see Norris, 2011; Torcal and Montero, 2006; Dionne, 2004) . The same disclaimer is relevant to how I have distinguished between literatures as the categorisations in Table 1 below are, I acknowledge, much more fluid in practice. Secondly, as outlined, a forthright articulation of why we need politicians is often absent from the contemporary anti-politics literature, so, for the most part, the discussion is driven by my interpretation of the implicit commitments each these scholars make about their value. Importantly, I acknowledge that each author has a different definition of politics (and anti-politics) that underpins their descriptive and normative stance, thus reinforcing my belief in the need to link these debates to broader theoretical discussions about the purpose of democratic leadership. Similarly, I acknowledge that there is a tension between the normative and descriptive aims of the studies I consider. However, I maintain that it is important to distinguish between the two, albeit acknowledging the endogenous limitations presented by any such attempt. Having outlined some of the limitations let me explain what I see to be the advantages this typology brings to the current debate. The purpose of Table 1 and the ensuing discussion is to provide a degree of conceptual clarity to what is currently a disparate field. There is, as I will illustrate, a growing body of work that sees popular disenchantment with politicians as an observable and worrying trend. However, for the most part the difference between these attempts -why they think the demonization of politicians is a critical problem for democracy and what they consider to be the solution -is less clear. Weber saw the competition between leadership types as the engine room of social change (see Ascher 2013) . Many of the authors discussed here would not go that far but do consider the actions of politicians to have some bearing on anti-political trends. As such, this classification, while not exhaustive or exclusive, goes some way ordering their reflections. Importantly, it reveals synergies and tensions between different types of analysis that can assist us in the creation of new lines of inquiry and associated research projects. To this end, the ensuing discussion is arranged so as to best illustrate how each strand of the debate seeks answers to questions that arise from other bodies of related work. In doing so it not only provides an important summary of state of the field, but also a roadmap for how this agenda can be pursued in the future.
The Parliamentarian
The procedural role that politicians play in a representative system is the most obvious place to start this discussion. A parliament has many functions, but debating and voting on legislation is central -it is the aspect of politics we explain first to high school students for example. Conversely, much is made of the hard work politicians make of this core task. In the public domain this critique predominantly concerns the nature of question time which is often seen to epitomise politicians behaving badly and illustrate that our political system is broken.
There have been numerous efforts to outline a blueprint for parliamentary reform -a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article. One of the most important is the version of decision-making principles and procedures advocated by deliberative democrats. This is a very diverse literature and I acknowledge that many of its key exponents would see little value in reforming current parliamentary systems, or, like Joshua Cohen (1997; 1989) , would see parliament as only one of many deliberative arenas. Moreover, deliberative democrats have tended not to be specifically interested in anti-politics; although their normative agenda is driven by a similar sense of disillusionment with the status quo.
However, from the perspective of this discussion, I am interested in those scholars working in this tradition who see value in parliaments as deliberative forums and, by extension, consider politicians to be indispensable to the democratic process (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Uhr, 1998; Fung, 2004) .
From this perspective, parliament can be a deliberative mechanism that turns political conflict into meaningful compromise and consensus, but its capacity to fulfil this role is distorted, either by moneyed or partisan interests, the short-termism encouraged by a twenty-four hour media cycle, or the temptations of executive domination. The ideal role for politicians, in this view, is defined primarily in terms of their function as parliamentarians who justify their decisions to the public by debating matters of common concern. Conversely, the demonisation of politicians largely stems from the perversion of this ideal in practice where reactive and poorly designed policy making produces sub-optimal outcomes that reflect the imperfect nature of deliberation. (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, p. 23) .
The Citizen-Legislator
Related to the deliberative turn, advocates of more participatory forms of decision-making provide a distinctive argument as to why we need politicians that fits with their 'supply side' critique of contemporary democratic practice (Hay and Stoker, 2009 disengaged politically and proposes a number of solutions about how this problem could be rectified -the most important of which, from the perspective of this article, is tied to his belief in reviving a 'politics for amateurs'. Stoker acknowledges that the current democratic malaise is not caused by the flawed character of its leaders and, yet, ends up placing the corporatisation of decision-making and the professionalisation of politics in the dockpoliticians have become insulated from their constituents by party bureaucracies and, as a result, are victims of their own focus groups and spin machines. To take back politics and political institutions, and to promote 'politics for amateurs', he contends that we (the public) must have greater authority over policy-making via localised participatory modes of governance: we need to revive the notion of a citizen-legislator.
Politics is a place for amateurs, but we need to design institutions, structure processes and develop support systems so that amateurs can engage and improve
their skills (Stoker, 2006, p. 150 (Hay, 2007, p. 157) .
Despite the subtle nuances that separate them, both Hay and Stoker retain a commitment to a more participatory form of politics. The assumption here is that we want to be more Democracy, assumes that a significant proportion of the population want greater input into political decisions and, yet, their survey material suggests the opposite: most people would much prefer to spend their time on non-political pursuits. Despite attempts to grapple with this problem (see Stoker, 2006, pp. 158-160; Evans, Stoker and Nasir, 2013) , this remains a thorny question for advocates of this perspective.
The Steward
In contrast, the 'demand side' approach sees the growth of stealth views about democracy and the unwillingness of citizens to be more actively engaged in political activity as the root cause of contemporary anti-political sentiment. From this perspective, the cause of the problem (public antipathy towards politics and politicians) primarily lies with the consumers -the people. and others (he includes chapters that defend politics against the market, denial, crisis and the media), but he makes a particular effort to highlight the danger of growing 'democratic decadents' or public apathy amongst the current generation who take these freedoms for granted -the vigour of the Arab spring is an obvious point of contrast (Flinders, 2012a, p. 160) . In this respect, he sees himself as diametrically opposed to the position espoused by John Keane (2009) (invasion, drought, famine, war, etc.) due to the security and stability provided to them by democratic politics (Flinders, 2012a, p. 125) .
In contrast to the two previous sets of literature that acknowledge we need politicians, but wish they were more deliberative or participatory, Flinders is the most vocal defender of current practice. Like Crick, his book is a veritable call to arms for those who believe in the value of politics. Political leadership, from this perspective, is a collective endeavour, but it is failing because the free riding public is not keeping up their end of the democratic bargain.
For Flinders, it is too easy to blame politicians for the current malaise as they are labouring under the weight of our shared 'democratic decadence'. The point then is not that politicians, as stewards of our welfare, should act more honourably, but rather that they are honourableour mistrust is consistent with other forms of moral panic (Jones, 2008; Flinders, 2012b; Hatier 2012, Wood and Flinders, 2012 (Flinders, 2012a, p. 3) .
The answer to anti-politics from this perspective involves reviving respect (and even deference) for political leaders fostered by encouraging greater understanding of the promise and limits of politics (hence the book); a position which most scholars of politics who teach their discipline would have some sympathy. But, aside from advocating greater awareness of the practical limitations that constrain what politicians and democratic politics can and does achieve, Flinders doesn't really tell us much about what should be taught. It is one thing to argue that politics matters but questions about how it matters are much thornier.
The Decision-Maker
Popular disillusionment with politics and politicians implicitly represents a challenge to contemporary forms of authority. Consequently, this article would not be complete without some reference to the way authority is defined and understood by the academy. Perversely, the anti-politics literature does not address this question in great detail -underscoring why making the conceptual link between the two bodies of work is important -and so to flesh out the typology I have had to cast the net further afield and the governance debate, which has become increasingly interested in depoliticization (see Fawcett and Marsh, forthcoming) , is the most obvious entry point. However, I do acknowledge that this literature sits somewhat awkwardly within this article as there is an obvious overlap between the emphasis I place on authority in this section and the other viewpoints I summarise. I do not deny that all of the perspectives discussed here in some way or another make claims about the nature and purpose of authority -how it is constructed and how it should be exercised. I do believe, however, that these ideas coalesce here more than elsewhere and in doing so sharpen questions about why the decision-making function of politicians is particularly important.
Both strands of the governance debate revolve around a form of authoritative instrumentalism. In the Westminster tradition, the older core executive story, first employed as a move away from prime minister versus cabinet debates in British politics (Dunleavy and Rhodes, 1990; Elgie, 1995 Elgie, , 2011 Heffernan, 2003) , sees political leaders, senior cabinet ministers and departmental heads as arbitrators between competing interests that are channelled via state-based institutions and their associated policy functions. Consequently, the challenge to executive authority by popular disenchantment with those who govern is primarily understood as a principle-agent dilemma: where state-based institutions are either unable or unwilling to implement government policies, or, due to poor coordination, competing interests and information asymmetry, policy actors undermine each other, usually via 'leaks'. From this perspective, the main solution involves increased executive authority, be it 'contingent and relational' (Rhodes, 2007 (Rhodes, , p. 1247 or structural, through hierarchy (managing the media cycle and less 'leaks'), and better government coordination (think phrases like 'whole-of-government' or 'joined up government'). Put simply, citizen concern with government performance is assuaged by improved policy implementation and better communication about what government has achieved (there are obvious similarities here with Pippa Norris' (2011) 'democratic deficit' argument). However, given that government, even in its now wider definition, is still primarily understood as a set of institutions, institutional reforms -whether they involve changes to accountability mechanisms, electoral systems or bureaucracies -are the main types of solutions promoted by advocates of this perspective.
The main alternative to both the Westminster or core executive description is the networked governance or differentiated polity model, most commonly associated with the work of Rod Rhodes (1997 Rhodes ( , 2007 . From this perspective the shift from government to governance is characterised by dispersed power, with networks replacing hierarchies and markets -leading to the 'hollowing out' of the state. This change is characterised by increased complexity, with political actors involved in a variety of processes that are shaped by globalisation, devolution and the growing involvement of non-governmental organisations in all facets of political life.
Politicians, in this view, remain influential, but, when compared with the core executive model, their authority has been undermined (Sørensen, 2006) . Specifically, their role is less transformative as policy-making has become more about negotiation. In short, politicians have become 'managers' who shape the rules, form narratives and channel resources. And, while there is much more to this literature than the simplified distinction I have presented between how managerial politicians operate either through a core executive or a differentiated polity -advocates of metagovernance retain an interest in path dependency and hierarchical networks for example (for review see Marsh, 2011b ; see also Jessop, 2004; Marsh et al., 2003; McAnulla, 2006) -from the perspective of this article the important point is that while we may disagree about the nature of the authority that politicians exercise, the fact that they have authority remains central to how we understand their function.
Running through this debate is a broader ontological and epistemological discussion. This is best illustrated by a brief account of Rhodes' move to interpretivism with Mark Bevir (2010), as outlined in their book The State as Cultural Practice. As opposed to the metagovernance story, often associated with critical realism, and core executive account, which is broadly institutionalist, they emphasise a decentred approach where actions are informed by the meanings and beliefs that individual actors hold within the context of governing traditions. In this view, the state and its authority is manufactured by the ideas actors hold about the world. 
The Advocate
Like their decision-making function, the case for why politicians as representatives is rarely put forcefully in the anti-politics litreature; deliberateive and participatory critiques, for example, engage with the idea but tend to focus on the distortion of the ideal rather than the function itself. Where it is considered it is usually as part of a broader sociological discussion about the politics of 'late modernity' and the changing nature of representation in contepmorary democracies. In this story, which begins with the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s and ends with the shift from government to governance and a more 'personalised' and 'decoupled' polity of the 21 st century, the nature of represenation has substantially changed and become increasingly hetrogenious as traditional political parties and the ideological cleavages they represent are undermined by growing social fragmentation (for review of this litreature see Bennett, 2012) . In many respects this characterisation of sociteal change is not disimilar to that described by Putnam (2000) and others above. consensus -the 'politics-policy' mode -and representation on an issue-by-issue basis -the 'policy-politics' mode (for review see Marsh, 2011a) . In Bang's model, late modernity increaingly requires politicians to 'advocate' on behalf of policy proposals that have been crafted by 'expert citizens', thus fundamentally altering their traditional role which was to ensure that the views of citizens were taken into account during the policy-making process.
Consequently, he argues that the main problem with the old input models of representation is that they do not acknowledged the far more positive role that politicians undertake on the output side of politics. And, if we understood the dynamics of this form of representation better we would be less inclined to demonise politicians.
The related 'celebrity politics' literature (see Marsh et al., 2010; Marsh and Fawcett, 2011) , makes a similar case. Marsh et al (2010, p 327) , for example, differentiate between three types of 'celebrity politics' that relate to politicians: celebrities who become politicians, politicians who become celebrities, and the politician who uses others' celebrity for political ends. Such politicians, they argue, reflect the new media age and consumer culture of late modernity; they 'advocate' on behalf of certain 'brands' (personal, commercial and party) that sell 'products' (personalities and policies). And, by seeking to differentiate themselves from the stigma associated traditional politicians, such representatives are often powerful critics of input side politics in some cases they come to 'represent' appeals to anti-politics and increasing depoliticization.
By seeking to better describe the changing nature of representation much of this work -and this is particularly true of Bang -emphasises the transformative capacity of a politics of truth to replace neo-liberalism's politics of threats (as embodied by the principle-agent model).
That is, if we better understood politicians' function in late modernity, and were able to encourage them to be honest about the limits of their role(s), we -the academy -could provide the people with a new vision of political authority tied to the acceptance of difference:
If we want to critique neoliberalism's politics of threats, we need begin from the presumption that political authority is analytically distinct from legitimacy, coercion, hierarchy and domination and that it has a creative potential for establishing a viable and balanced political relationship between political authorities and laypeople based
on nothing but their mutual acceptance and recognition of each other's difference (Bang, 2011, p. 435) .
But, do the public want the truth? Ontological questions aside, and even if we could agree on the appropriate norms that encourage truth-telling, does the public really want their politicians to be honest brokers? Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) argue that, above everything else, people do not like being taken for fools by their political leaders. But, does this mean we would prefer to be told that policy-making is, to borrow Weber's ( [1919 ) famous phrase, 'a strong and slow boring of hard boards'? Do we want to believe that compromise is important and that governments only have limited capacity to improve our lives? Can we, to use Colonel Jessep's now clichéd line from A Few Good Men, handle the truth?
The Thespian
Since antiquity, politics has been associated with performance, the art of rhetoric and persuasion. This is not irreconcilable with the image of an advocate discussed above, but it does consider truth-telling in a fundamentally different light by illustrating, and even celebrating, the fact that politics is a form of vaudeville that is primarily concerned with constructing the truth. Politicians, from this perspective, are acting out a role that we may not like but we do need; and at the end of the day while we may not like who they are or the way they operate, the system does not work without them. Maarten Hajer's (2010) 
book
Authoritative Governance employs terms like 'performative habitus' and 'networked dramaturgy', and metaphors like 'staging', 'setting' and 'scripting', to describe how political leaders manufacture authority in the new era of networked governance. Authority, for Hajer, has a fundamentally communicative quality and is therefore not given, but must be constantly (re)enacted, usually through the media. Like the work on celebrity politics, politicians are political personalities: 'frantically searching for ways to appeal to their public' (Hajer, 2010, p. 4) . But, where this is seen by some as a new phenomenon, and as a problem for those who hark back to a lost golden age of honourable stewardship, for Hajer no such period existed.
Rather, politics has always been about performance, with the main change being that, due to fragmented meanings and a multiplicity of actors and arenas, the new era of networked governance has made acting out the script more complex.
The familiarity of popular disenchantment with political leaders is also a theme in David Runciman's (2008, p. 196) book Political Hypocrisy in which he argues that there is no easy solution to the problem of 'deceitful and dissembling' politicians, as we require them to act out competing performances -to wear masks. From this perspective, if contemporary politicians are failing it is because they are unconvincing liars, there is no shared repertoire, and society has become obsessed with conspiracies and uncovering the 'truth'. For Runciman (2008, p. 196) , it is only by recognising the essential familiarity of popular disillusionment that we can begin to appreciate the misplaced nature of much of this sentiment is.
Others, like Barry Hindess' (1996 , 2001 ), see demonisation as fundamentally linked to popular concern with corruption, rather than, for example, disenchantment directed at endless factionalism. In particular, he contends that anti-politics is symptomatic of an idealised vision of the public sphere that has been invaded by private interests and concerns -begetting tyranny:
… most if not all contemporary understandings of politics could be seen as derived from idealised representations of the public life of the cities of classical antiquity. As a result, they are commonly infected by concerns over the boundaries between the political and the non-political -and in particular by the fear that politics will be corrupted through the intrusion of extraneous elements and that politics itself will
tend to corrupt other aspects of the life of the community (Hindess, 1996, p. 36) .
The performance of politicians, from this perspective, is increasingly measured against this ideal standard which has deep roots in the liberal tradition (Hindess 1996, p. 33) . The problem for those who seek to uphold this tradition is that if we acknowledge that performance is relative and context specific, and thus relax our devotion to the ideal, the question then becomes not whether our politicians are corrupt, but how corrupt do we want them to be?
Finally, the naive repetitiveness of calls for better political leaders is also a feature of Kane and Patapan's (2012) recent book Democratic Leadership in which they argue that the tension between leadership and the democratic principle of popular sovereignty, where all people are equal, is at the heart of the 'problem' we have with our politicians. It is a problem, they claim, that cannot be solved. Rather, we must reconcile ourselves with the perpetual negotiation between leaders and followers required by democratic government -they see this tension as central to its dynamism and energy rather than undermining it. Like many of the authors discussed here, Kane and Patapan believe the academy has an important role to play in increasing public awareness about the conflicting demands that popular sovereignty places on democratic leaders in the belief that sympathetic appreciation can temper demonization.
The Demonisation of Politicians: Future Research
Having outlined how different strands of the anti-politics literature incorporate why we need politicians into their analysis, let me conclude with a brief discussion of what this typology asks us to do differently. Firstly, however, it is important to note that in many respects one thing that almost all of these scholars agree on is that taking this discussion outside of the academy and into the broader public domain is, as Crick exemplifies, the more pressing task, we want them to be like and how they should conduct themselves. Such debates are often ignored because they are either too complicated or have no satisfactory conclusion, or because it is hard to find something new to say. However, it is precisely because of their thorniness that we must continuously revisit them. As this typology demonstrates, descriptive and normative accounts of why we need politicians vary widely according to the views each of us holds about how we ought to be governed. Yet, despite this diversity, or perhaps because of it, populist negativity towards politicians as a group persists. As such, what this typology hints at, and what I suspect further conceptual work will reveal, is that there is no consensus around these questions and, in part, this plurality is at the heart of popular disillusionment; we might not be able to reach consensus on what politicians should be doing but we can at least agree that they are not doing what we want them to. In essence, this points us in the direction of the 'democratic leadership paradox' that Kane and Patapan (2012) describe.
The typology also highlights several empirical questions. From a critical perspective, there is already a burgeoning group of scholars interested in deliberative and participatory democracy, with a considerable research agenda underway (for review see Thompson, 2008; Leighninger, 2012 (Rhodes, 2012; Arklay et al., 2006) . This is a sad, and ultimately detrimental, disciplinary oversight, as life history writing can, despite its Lincoln was vilified in his lifetime in much the same way that politicians are today even though he is now immortalised as one of democracies greatest heroes. Half a century ago, Crick's Defence had an eye on the dangers of nationalism and totalitarianism in particular.
Here, we have been more concerned with elite capture, professional politicians, democratic decadents and neo-liberalism. In either case, we need to better understand the history of antipolitics, as a term and an idea.
Finally, truth-telling is a theme that runs through nearly all of these accounts. Ontological and epistemological questions aside, we all largely agree that politicians do not always tell the truth. In certain circumstances, as the Thespian section highlights, we also do not want politicians to tell us the truth, but, for the most part, we consider public trust to be a fundamental feature of democratic government, even if this trust is generated by 'performance', rather than 'authentic' representation. understanding what happens when politicians do tell the truth, or at least claim to tell the truth, is vital to how we conceptualise anti-politics and frame our response?
Conclusion
In this article I have reviewed the critical literature on anti-politics and the demonisation of politicians. In doing so I examined the implicit rationale for why we need politicians that each of these literatures offers -identifying six in particular: procedural, legitimacy, values, authority, persuasion and dissimulation. While I found that there is significant disagreement about what the appropriate role of politicians is, and should be, there are also features of this debate that we largely agree upon. In particular, I highlighted a general belief that if the public better understood political practice they would be less inclined to demonise those involved. Aside from being an important research question, I argued that this conviction points us towards several important avenues for future inquiry, including 1) the revival of age-old questions about the purpose of politics; 2) investigation of the views and experiences of political actors about their job; 3) the history of anti-politics as a term and an idea; and 4)
an examination of what happens when politicians tell the truth. This list is obviously not exhaustive, but in framing possible areas for new research it is my hope that other scholars will take up the same question that I have sketched an answer to here and ask: but why do we need politicians?
